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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-4244 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH PASSALAQUA, 
                        Appellant 
____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 10-cr-667-02) 
District Judge:  Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 4, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 8, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Joseph Passalaqua pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to interfere 
with commerce by threat or violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) for his part in 
three armed robberies.  He appeals from his sentence of 190 months of imprisonment, 
arguing that the District Court was substantively unreasonable in varying 55 months 
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above the high end of his guidelines range.  In light of the nature and circumstances of 
Passalaqua’s crimes, the underrepresentation of his criminal history, and the need to 
avoid disparities between Passalaqua and his co-defendants, the upward variance was 
reasonable, and we will affirm. 
I. 
 Passalaqua was a 56-year-old Temple University graduate and small-business 
owner when he undertook a violent and bizarre crime spree in 2009.  In an apparent effort 
to raise funds to save his failing martial arts and gymnastics school, Passalaqua began 
actively cultivating a reputation as a member of the mafia by hiring large men to escort 
him to clubs where they posed as his bodyguards and entourage.  Before long, Passalaqua 
fell in with a group of criminals and began to live out his criminal fantasy.  
Between December 2008 and September 2009, Passalaqua and a rotating group of 
eight co-conspirators committed nine burglaries and five armed robberies.1
                                              
1 On December 20, 2010, Passalaqua pleaded guilty in state court to nine burglaries and 
one armed robbery committed during this crime spree.  He was sentenced to fifteen years 
on the robbery charge and five years on each burglary charge, all to run concurrently to 
his federal sentence. 
  Four of these 
armed robberies were federally charged and Passalaqua played a substantial role by 
planning and serving as a getaway driver in three of them: (1) the armed robbery of 
Ristorante Barolo in New York City on May 11, 2009; (2) the home invasion and armed 
robbery of the private residence of a local pizzeria owner in Milltown, New Jersey on 
May 21, 2009; and (3) the armed robbery of Ritz Diner in Livingston, New Jersey on 
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June 5, 2009.2
Passalaqua was arrested on September 23, 2009, and began cooperating with the 
government soon thereafter in anticipation of seeking a downward departure under 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The government arrested several of Passalaqua’s co-conspirators based 
on the information he provided.  During the investigation, the government learned that 
Passalaqua had failed to disclose that he and his co-conspirators robbed Ristorante 
Barolo.  Because of this omission, Passalaqua was no longer a credible cooperator and 
the government had to then rebuild its case, which it did by offering a § 5K1.1 letter to 
one of Passalaqua’s co-conspirators instead.  Nevertheless, the parties entered into a 
“guideline plea” in which both sides agreed to stipulate to certain facts and to 
Passalaqua’s baseline offense level of 30.  The guideline plea prohibited either side from 
  In each of the robberies, Passalaqua’s co-conspirators entered the 
residence or establishment at night wearing masks, threatened the occupants with guns, 
bound the occupants with zip-ties, and then used tools to pry open safes or forced victims 
to input combinations.  The home invasion was particularly brutal because the 
perpetrators bound and assaulted the disabled woman they found asleep in the home and 
waited for her husband to return home so that they could beat him before breaking into 
the family’s safes.  Passalaqua frequented the pizzeria owned by the victims and 
allegedly picked their residence as a target in retaliation for a dispute over an outstanding 
$700 bill. 
                                              
2 Passalaqua did not participate in the fourth armed robbery.  Apparently angry about 
being excluded, he approached the victims of the robbery and offered to kill the 
perpetrators (his co-conspirators) for a fee.  As part of the plea agreement, the 
government dismissed the murder-for-hire charge against him. 
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arguing for an upward or downward departure, adjustment, or variance from the offense 
level of 30.  The guideline plea did not address the criminal history category and both 
parties reserved their rights relative to it.  
Before the plea hearing, defense counsel requested a new plea agreement 
containing only factual stipulations and no guidelines stipulation.  The “fact stip plea,” 
which was signed on December 4, 2010, did not include a stipulation as to Passalaqua’s 
base offense level and did not prohibit either side from arguing for a sentence outside of 
the guideline range. 
A sentencing hearing was held on June 22, 2011, but continued to November 14, 
2011, so that the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) who had been involved in 
plea negotiations could be present.  A disagreement about whether or not the government 
should have informed the defense counsel that it planned to seek an upward variance as a 
matter of professional courtesy when the defense requested the substitution of the fact 
stip plea for the guideline plea was a focus of both hearings.  Ultimately, the issue was of 
little consequence as both sides agree the government was under no obligation not to seek 
the variance or to inform the defense of its intent to seek it.  Passalaqua never asked to 
withdraw his plea, never alleged that the agreement was executed in bad faith, and agreed 
to proceed under it (all of which the District Court confirmed during the hearings).  
At the hearings, the parties agreed that under the guidelines, Passalaqua’s offense 
level was 30 and his criminal history was category II, which yields a guidelines range of 
108-135 months imprisonment. Passalaqua argued for a downward variance based on his 
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cooperation.  The District Court concluded that Passalaqua was not entitled to any 
leniency based on cooperation given his lie to the government. 
The government sought an upward variance to the statutory maximum of 240 
months.  After hearing argument from both sides, the District Court considered the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and concluded that the brutality of the crimes, the trauma 
inflicted on the victims, the need to deter such crime sprees, Passalaqua’s leadership role 
in the conspiracy, his criminal history category that understated Passalaqua’s past, and 
the sentences given to the other co-conspirators all weighed in favor of an upward 
variance.  The District Court sentenced Passalaqua to 190 months.   
II. 
 Passalaqua claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because (1) the 
§ 3553(a) factors favor leniency, not an upward variance; (2) the variance was driven by 
emotion and was overly punitive; and (3) the sentence results in unwarranted sentencing 
disparities. 
 The standard of review governing sentencing determinations is “abuse of 
discretion.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).  In reviewing a sentence 
imposed, this Court considers the procedural reasonableness and the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51.  The “touchstone” of reasonableness is whether 
the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc).  “Under our highly deferential standard of review of a sentencing court's 
decisions, we are to affirm a court’s procedurally sound sentence unless no reasonable 
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sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 708 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 To begin, Passalaqua argues that the District Court inappropriately fixated on the 
brutal nature of his crimes and did not adequately consider the other § 3553(a) factors. 
The record, however, does not bear this out. The District Court considered each of the 
§ 3553(a) factors, and identified those factors that weighed in favor of leniency (i.e. his 
age and the unlikelihood of recidivism), other factors that were not relevant (i.e. the need 
for additional education), and factors that weighed in favor of a longer sentence (i.e. the 
brutality of the crimes, the sadistic character of the defendant, the need for deterrence, 
and the need to avoid disparities between the most culpable co-conspirators). 
Furthermore, the District Court did not fail to consider Passalaqua’s arguments as the 
court did in United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2009) (failing to consider 
mitigating evidence because of a preoccupation with revolting nature of the child 
pornography is reversible error), nor did the District Court merely recite the § 3553(a) 
factors without any meaningful consideration of their applicability like the court in 
United States v. Asburn, 502 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2007). Passalaqua’s reliance on these 
cases is misplaced. 
 Passalaqua next attacks his sentence on the basis that the AUSA was overly 
emotional and vindictive, and that this tainted the District Court’s reasoning. His brief 
quotes from portions of the second sentencing hearing in which the AUSA expressed her 
“personal fury” at the defendant and the “anxiety” and “nausea” she suffered as a result 
7 
 
of his lies during the investigation, and argues that the government’s motion for an 
upward variance was retaliation for Passalaqua’s lie.  This argument is flawed in several 
respects.  First, Passalauqa takes the AUSA’s comments out of context—the comments 
were made in reference to the extended discussion about professional courtesy, and not 
with respect to the government’s motion for an upward variance. Second, after learning 
that Passalaqua had lied to the government and was no longer a viable cooperator, the 
AUSA still offered (and Passalaqua initially accepted) a guidelines stipulation that would 
have prevented the government from arguing in favor of an upward variance.  Indeed,  it 
was Passalaqua who requested a fact stip plea allowing both sides to make variance 
arguments.  Additionally, the AUSA who moved for the upward variance was not the 
AUSA who negotiated the pleas and expressed her personal fury at the defendant during 
the second sentencing hearing (that AUSA was out on maternity leave at the time the 
motion for an upward variance was made).  Finally, the District Court expressly stated 
that the disagreement between counsel would not affect its sentencing decision.   
 Passalaqua also argues that he was singled out for an upward variance and that his 
sentence results in an unwarranted sentencing disparity between himself and his co-
conspirators. While Passalaqua is correct that the government did not seek upward 
variances in the case of any of his co-conspirators, the government was bound not to 
because each of his co-conspirators accepted a guidelines plea that he rejected.  
Passalaqua’s disparity argument ultimately boils down to his contention that he is 
more like co-conspirators Groem (1 robbery, 75-month sentence), Lally (1 robbery, 33-
month sentence), Landin (1 home invasion, 108-month sentence), Parolin (1 robbery, 79-
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month sentence) and Prascak (1 robbery, 48-month sentence) than Danise (4 robberies, 
received § 5K1.1 cooperation credit, pled to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) with 84-month 
mandatory minimum, 145-month sentence) and Paul (4 robberies, pled to § 924(c) with 
84-month mandatory minimum, 219-month sentence).  However, even defense counsel 
agreed that Passalaqua, Danise, and Paul formed the “upper-echelon” of the conspiracy. 
The District Court rejected Passalaqua’s argument that Danise’s and Paul’s sentences 
should each be discounted by 84-months when comparing their sentences to his because 
they pled to an additional § 924(c) count.  Instead, the District Court reasoned that 
Passalaqua was equally responsible for the brutality of the crimes and that the charging 
decision of the government did not affect the basic culpability of the co-conspirators or 
the similarity of their sentences.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and 
sentence. 
